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Abstract
We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni- and multi-
dimensional policy spaces. We keep throughout the survey the assumption that
there is an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy
proposals once elected. The survey stresses the importance of three modeling
assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in election results, (ii) the parties
objectives (electoral maximizing their expected vote share, or their probability
of winning the electionspolicy oriented or both), and (iii) the voterspreferences
(if and how they care for parties beyond the policies implemented by the winner).
1 Introduction
Most papers in the political economy literature have concentrated on some form of
median voter theoremwithin the so-called Downsian approach, with 2 parties
(or candidates) simultaneously proposing platforms (belonging to unidimensional
policy spaces) to voters and committing to implement their platform if elected.
Moreover, parties are assumed to care only about winning the elections, while
voters care only about policies. Finally, there is no uncertainty in the model,
in the sense that parties can perfectly anticipate the election results at the time
where parties propose their platform.
As mentioned by Roemer (2006), there are many problems associated with this
approach and with the results it generates. Parties do not care for policies, which
contradicts how they have developed historically. There is no room for voters to
care about the identity of the elected party (as opposed to the policy this party
enacts). The lack of electoral uncertainty at the time parties choose their platform
constitutes a very strong assumption. Finally, concerning the results of the model,
the convergence of parties to the same policies is not observed in practice (as we
will show later on in the survey), and this model has generically no equilibrium
in pure strategies as soon as the policy space is multi-dimensional.
The objective of this paper is to survey the literature on the positioning of po-
litical parties in uni- and multi-dimensional policy spaces. We will keep through-
out the survey the assumption that there is an exogenous number of parties who
commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. This survey will stress
the importance of three modeling assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in
election results, (ii) the partiesobjectives (electoral maximizing their expected
vote share, or their probability of winning the electionsor policy oriented), and
(iii) the voterspreferences (if and how they care for parties beyond the policies
implemented by the winner). We now turn to the plan of this survey.
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We describe the general setting and notation used throughout the survey in
section 2. Then show in section 3 that, in the absence of uncertainty, parties con-
verge to the same policy whether they are electorally or policy motivated when
the policy space is unidimensional, and that there is generically no equilibrium in
pure strategies for multidimensional policy spaces. The rst conclusion we draw is
that introducing some form of uncertainty as to the election results is primordial.
There are several di¤erent ways to introduce uncertainty. The easiest one is to add
some noise to the votersbehavior, irrespective of the policy proposals of the par-
ties. We develop this so-called stochastic partisanship approach in section 4. We
then assume alternatively that parties are uncertain as to the policy preferences
of voters in section 5 where we detail several ways to introduce this uncertainty,
varying in the degree of micro-foundation of the uncertainty, in section 5.1. Such
uncertainty creates a discontinuity in the expected vote/probability of winning
function when both parties propose the same policy, so that there are equilibrium
existence problems when parties are electorally motivated. We then concentrate
on policy motivated parties in section 5.2, and on the case where parties have
both electoral and policy motivations in section 5.3. In both cases, we rst deal
with analytical results before mentioning various applications of these models.
We then examine in section 6 models in which candidateselectoral prospects
depend on a valence componentvotersnon-policy evaluation of candidatesand
where all voters agree that one party has better characteristics than another.
Section 6.1 is devoted to the study of unidimensional policy spaces. We analyze
in section 6.1.1 the case where there is uncertainty as to the election results, while
section 6.1.2 is devoted to the case where uncertainty concerns the valence of the
candidates. Section 6.2 deals with valence in multidimensional policy spaces. We
present di¤erent theoretical models in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4, while section 6.2.5
concentrates on a specic empirical application.
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Finally, in Section 7 we present the unied model developed by Adams,
Merrill and Grofman where voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for
the parties enacting them. More precisely, voters di¤er in their partisanship, with
some being closer to one party and others to another party, with this partisanship
a¤ecting their policy preferences. Adams et al. also add a random component to
the votersutility, as in section 4. We start in section 7.1 with the description of
their model, including some analytical results that they obtain. We then move
in section 7.2 to two empirical applications of this model (to the 1988 French
presidential elections, and the 1989 election in Norway). We consider an empirical
extension where valence is added to this unied model (as in sections 6.1.1 and
6.1.2) in section 7.3, before o¤ering a general conclusion in section 8.
2 General setting and notation
We give here the basic setting and notation used throughout the survey. The policy
space is denoted by X and is a subset of the Euclidean space with d dimensions.
X is assumed to be non-empty, convex and compact. There are n voters, where
n can be nite (in which case it is assumed to be odd) or innite. There are J
political parties, or candidates, with J  2.1 Since most papers deal with only 2
parties, we use below the notation j 2 fA;Bg (or A andD in section 6, for reasons
which will become obvious there) whenever possible rather than j 2 f1; :::; Jg.
All voters are endowed with a utility function ui(x; j), where x 2 X and j 2
fA;Bg. In words, voters care for policies but may also care for the party proposing
the policy. Voter is utility function is assumed to be concave over X, and we
denote by ~xi voter is most-preferred policy (also called an ideal or blisspoint).
Note that this blisspoint is independent of the partys identity. In some sections,
1We will use the terms candidate and party interchangeably throughout the survey.
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we also assume that preferences are Euclidean, so that voter is utility is decreasing
in the distance between the proposed policy x and her blisspoint ~xi.
All parties simultaneously choose a policy x in X, which we denote by xj,
j 2 fA;Bg, which they commit to enact if they are elected. Voters observe xj
and simultaneously vote for the party that o¤ers them the highest utility level.2
We are looking for Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the game played among
parties. In the absence of such a Nash equilibrium, we will look for either a local
Nash equilibrium (section 6.2.2) or for a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The partiesobjectives may be electoral, policy-related, or both. We consider
two types of electoral motivations: maximizing the probability of winning the
elections (henceforth called the win motivation), and the expected number (or
fraction) of votes (the vote motivation). We denote by j(xA; xB) the proba-
bility that party j 2 fA;Bg wins the election when it proposes policy xA while
its opponent proposes xB, and by EVj(xA; xB) its expected vote. In the case of
policy motivation, we assume that each party j is endowed with a utility function
Uj(x). This utility function will be in most cases given exogenously, but may also
be endogeneized as part of the equilibrium. We denote party js most-preferred
policy (i.e., the policy maximizing Uj(x)) as ~xj, j 2 fA;Bg).
A very important distinction is between deterministic voting (where all candi-
dates can predict with certainty the voting behavior of all individual voters at the
time where policy platforms are o¤ered) and probabilistic voting (where voting
behavior is modelled as a random variable from the perspective of the candidates,
with parties computing the probability that each voter gets more utility under its
proposal than under its adversarys). In the latter case, we will talk of aggregate
uncertainty when parties are unable to forecast with certainty the election results
2This behavior, often called sincere voting, corresponds to the elimination of weakly undom-
inated strategies when J = 2 and voting is assumed, as here, to be costless. In case several
parties give the same utility to a voter, she fairly randomizes her vote among those parties.
4
at the time where platforms are made public. Observe that probabilistic voting
does not imply aggregate uncertainty: as we will see in section 4, if there is a large
number of voters who are a¤ected by i.i.d. shocks to their utility function, the
voting behavior of any individual voter is stochastic, but their aggregate behavior
(and thus the election results) is known with certainty, thanks to the law of large
numbers. Depending on the model presented, we will either introduce uncertainty
at the micro level (i.e., at the level of the individual voter), or at the macro level
(i.e., at the level of the electorate, without providing the micro-foundations for
this aggregate uncertainty)see section 5.1.
3 Deterministic voting
In this section, we assume away uncertainty, so that parties know the individual
voters preferences and can compute with certainty the voting behavior of all
individuals when choosing their platforms. Moreover, we assume that voters care
only about policies, so that ui(x; j) = ui(x) for all voters i and parties j = fA;Bg.
It is well know since Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) that,
Proposition 1 Assume that there is no uncertainty, that d = 1 and that both
parties are electorally motivated (maximizing either their probability of winning
or their number of votes), then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies where both parties propose the median voters ideal point: med(~xi).
This result is known as the median voter theorem.Moreover, it is also known
since Plott (1967) and Hinich et al (1973), among others,3 that
3McKelvey (1976, 1979), Schoeld (1978, 1983, 1985), Cohen and Matthews (1980), McK-
elvey and Schoeld (1986, 1987), Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991), Banks (1995), Saari (1997), and
Austen-Smith and Banks (1999). Eaton and Lipsey (1975) also obtained instability results when
there are three or more candidates.
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Proposition 2 Assume that there is no uncertainty, that d > 1 and that both
parties are electorally motivated (maximizing either their probability of winning or
their number of votes), then there generically does not exist any Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
The generalization of Proposition 1 to a multidimensional setting requires the
existence of a median in all dimensions of the policy space. This in turn re-
quires that the distribution of votersmost-preferred policies be radially symmet-
ric, which is an extremely restrictive assumption. Moreover, any move from a ra-
dially symmetric distribution of blisspoints, however small, results in the (generic)
non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.4
As for equilibria in mixed strategies, there is no general existence theorem
because the partiespayo¤s are not continuous in general when d > 1. Duggan and
Jackson (2005) show that, if indi¤erent voters are allowed to randomize with any
probability between zero and one (rather than with 1/2 as often assumed), then
mixed equilibria do exist. Moreover, they show that, starting with a distribution
of individuals such as a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy exists and perturbing
this distribution, then the equilibrium mixed strategies of the parties will put
probabilities arbitrarily close to one on policies near the original equilibrium in
pure strategies. In other words, mixed strategy equilibrium outcomes change in a
continuous way when voter preferences are perturbed.5
What about moving away from electoral preferences towards policy motiva-
tions? Unfortunately, this does not change the results with d = 1, as shown in
the next proposition due to Wittman (1977), Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994):
4Alternatively, existence may occur when the decision rule requires a su¢ ciently large ma-
jority (Schoeld, 1984; Strand, 1985; Caplin and Nalebu¤, 1988).
5McKelvey (1986), Cox (1987), and Banks, Duggan and Le Breton (2002) show that the
support of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria lies in the uncovered set, a centrally located
subset of the policy space.
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Proposition 3 Assume that there is no uncertainty, that d = 1 and that both
parties are policy motivated with ~xA < med(~xi) < ~xB, then there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where both parties propose the median voters
most-preferred blisspoint: med(~xi).
Since parties care for the implemented policy, they rst have to win the election
in order to inuence this policy. When parties are located on opposite sides of
the median voters blisspoint, this requires them to converge to this position.6
The introduction of policy motivation under certainty then results in the same
prediction as the classical Downsian modelling where parties are o¢ ce motivated
and compete on a single dimension.
What about multidimensional policy spaces? At rst, there is more hope
to have an equilibrium in pure strategies than with electoral motivations, for the
following reason. With electoral motivation, a party nds it protable to deviate to
any policy which is preferred by a majority to the policy proposed by its opponent.
With policy motivations, a protable deviation must moreover increase the utility
of the deviating party. There are then fewer potentially protable deviations.
Unfortunately, Duggan and Fey (2005) prove that an equilibrium in pure
strategies will almost never exist when d > 2. More precisely, they come up
with Plott-like conditions where voters with exactly opposite preferences in the d-
dimensional space are paired with each other. Interestingly, in the knife edge case
where such an equilibrium exists when d  2, both Duggan and Fey (2005) and
Roemer (2001) show that a near universal feature of the equilibrium is that both
parties propose the same policy, which is most-preferred by at least one voter.
Finally, the results by Duggan and Jackson (2005) apply here as well, so that a
mixed equilibrium exists if indi¤erent voters randomize in a exible way.
6If med(~xi) < ~xA < ~xB ; then both parties proposing ~xA is an equilibrium, since party A gets
its most-preferred policy, while party B can only a¤ect the implemented policy by proposing a
policy to the left of ~xA, which it dislikes even more than ~xA.
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The message of this section is thus pretty bleak: if d = 1, we obtain convergence
to the median blisspoint irrespective of the (electoral or policy) motivation of
parties, while there is generically no equilibrium in pure strategies with d > 2.
We now introduce uncertainty, so that parties see the individual votersbe-
havior as random. We rst look at situations with stochastic partisanship, then
to stochastic preferences.
4 The stochastic partisanship approach
One way to introduce uncertainty is to assume that uncertainty a¤ects voters
preferences. This is modeled by assuming that voterspreferences are a¤ected by
a random shock determining the bias the voter has for one of the two parties, the
so-called stochastic partisanship approach.
4.1 Theory
In this section, we assume that voterspreferences are additively separable into
their preferences for policies and for parties, so that with slightly abusing notation,
ui(x; j) =

ui(x) if j = A
ui(x) + i if j = B
where the vector of party biases (1; :::; n) is seen as a random variable by both
candidates A and B.7 More precisely, both parties have the same beliefs and
assume that each i is distributed according to the cdf Fi with pdf fi > 0 over
its support. Observe that we do not assume that these biases are independently
distributed. The probability that voter i will vote for party A is then given by
7Coughlin and Nitzan (1982) study the multiplicative formulation, where voter is utility
function is log-concave with i voting for party A if ui(xA)  ui(xB)i.Duggan (2014) indeed
shows that the two approaches are equivalent, up to a simple transformation.
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the probability that his bias i in favor of party B is lower than the di¤erence in
utility ui(x) between the proposals of party A and party B:
iA(xA; xB) = Fi (ui(xA)  ui(xB)) and iB = 1  iA: (1)
We will only study the vote motivation for parties in this section and refer the
reader to Duggan (2014) for win and policy motivations (which have been less
extensively studied in the literature). Party A then maximizes
EVA(xA; xB) =
Xn
i=1
iA(xA; xB);
while party B maximizes EVB(xA; xB) = n  EVA(xA; xB).
The next proposition has been proven by Hinich (1977, 1978), Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987, 1993) and has been generalized by Banks and Duggan (2005):
Proposition 4 In the stochastic partisanship model with vote motivation and d 
1, if (xA; x

B) is an interior equilibrium, then
xA = x

B = x = arg max
x2X
X
i
fi(0)ui(x): (2)
In words, both parties converge to the same policy x, which is the (unique)
policy maximizing weighted sum of the individualsutilities, where the weights
used correspond to the densities of the votersbiases at zero, fi(0). The intu-
ition for this result is that the neutralvoters (those with i = 0) are the ones
whose votes are the most easily swayed in favor of the party. As both parties
compete to attract these voters who are the easiest to convince to change their
vote, they end up proposing the same platform.8 This proposition holds whatever
the dimensionality of the policy space.
8 x has no normative appeal, since there is no normative general reason for any social planner
to use these specic weights. A special case arises where all voters i share the same distribu-
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Proposition 4 does not tackle the problem of the existence of the equilibrium.
Observe from (1) that the probability that a given individual i votes for party A is
a continuous function of party As proposal. This translates into the continuity of
the expected vote function with respect to the partys proposal. In other words,
introducing uncertainty smooths the partiesobjectives. The other condition (be-
yond continuity) needed to have an equilibrium in pure strategies is that parties
objectives be quasi-concave. The following proposition (due to Hinich, Ledyard
and Ordeshook (1972, 1973), Enelow and Hinich (1989) and Lindbeck and Weibull
(1993)) gives su¢ cient conditions on the cdf Fi to have an equilibrium:
Proposition 5 In the stochastic partisanship model with vote motivation and d 
1, su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies are
that (i) Fi (ui(x)  ui(y)) is concave in x and (ii) Fi (ui(y)  ui(x)) is convex in
x, for each voter i and all policies y 2 X.
Propositions 1 and 4 may seem to clash with each other, in the following sense:
without uncertainty and with d = 1, the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is for
both parties to propose the median most-preferred point. Adding a small amount
of uncertainty (with distributions functions Fi of biases converging to the point
mass on zero) then moves the equilibrium policy to (the utilitarian unweighted
optimum) x. This apparent clash can be explained away thanks to Laussel and
Le Breton (2002) who have proved that the equilibrium in pure strategies fails
to exist in the stochastic partisanship model when voting behavior is close to
deterministic. In other words, one needs su¢ ciently large uncertainty for the suf-
cient conditions mentioned in Proposition 5 to hold. It is worth stressing this
point, since it indicates that stochastic partisanship probabilistic voting can actu-
ally create existence problems in one-dimensional settings where a deterministic,
tion Fi, in which case policy x is the utilitarian optimum (maximizing the unweighted sum of
utilities).
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Downsian equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Thanks to the continuity of parties payo¤s, an equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists with stochastic partisanship probabilistic models. Moreover, Banks and
Duggan (2005) show that the support of this equilibrium converges to the median
most-preferred policy when the amount of noise goes to zero. Finally, observe that
moving to a win motivation for parties makes the existence problem worse, in the
sense that the conditions enunciated in Proposition 5 are not su¢ cient anymore to
guarantee existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Duggan, 2014).
In other words, it is even more di¢ cult to generate quasi-concave payo¤ functions
for parties with a win motivation, compared to a vote motivation.
4.2 Applications
The stochastic partisanship modeling has proved very attractive and has been
used in many applications to specic policy dimensions. As Persson and Tabellini
mention in their 2000 textbook, the reason for this success is that these models
have unique equilibria even when the policy conict is multidimensional(p59).
For instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000) apply this approach to the modeling of
special interest politics (chapter 7), alternative electoral rules (chapter 8), public
debt issued by partisan candidates (chapter 14), or where candidates care about
economic policies not because of their ideology, but because they want to appro-
priate rents for themselves (chapter 4). At the same time, this approach has not
been used to explain empirically the policy positions of political parties in actual
elections. Even for unidimensional policy, Persson and Tabellini (2000) write that
they know of no attempts in the literature to try and discriminate empirically
between this model of electoral competition and the median voter model. (p58).
One reason for this lack of application is that the stochastic partisanship approach
predicts that both parties should converge to the same policy platforms. As we
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will see later (see section 7.2), this prediction is not supported by the empirically
evidence. Moreover, it is worth recalling here Laussel and Le Breton (2000)s
conclusion that intrinsic preferences for candidates must be dispersed enough
across the electorate to make the rst order approach [underlying Proposition 4]
valid (...). Hopefully the next wave of empirical structural models of electoral
competition will incorporate that aspect into the picture.
Observe that, if the biases are independently distributed and if there is a
large number of voters, then there is no aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that,
thanks to the law of large numbers, the result of the election is deterministic when
both parties announce their policy platforms. In other words, we need either a
small number of voters, or correlated shocks, for aggregate uncertainty to occur
with probabilistic partisanship models. We now move to alternate modelling of
uncertainty on individual voting behavior, which generates aggregate uncertainty.
5 The stochastic preferences approach
An alternative way to introduce uncertainty is to assume that voters do not have
partisan preferences, as in the previous section, but rather that parties are uncer-
tain as to the policy preferences of voters.
5.1 Micro vs macro uncertainty over voterspreferences
There are two approaches to modelling the partiesuncertainty as to the voters
policy preferences. The rst starts at the individual voter level, and constructs
the expected vote/probability of winning functions of both parties by aggregating
votersbehaviors. The second models parties as having macro level uncertainty
as to the election results. We briey describe a few examples of these two ap-
proaches, starting with the micro approach.
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One way to model the rst approach is to assume that voters are endowed
with concave and di¤erentiable utility functions
ui(xi; i);
where i 2  is a preference parameter distributed according to the cdfGi(): Each
individual i has a most-preferred policy which is a function of its type, ~xi(i). One
can then move from the uncertainty in i represented by Gi to uncertainty with
respect to the distribution of most-preferred points, as represented by the cdf Hi.
We need not assume that the types i are drawn independently, but rather that
the types are su¢ ciently dispersed (see Duggan (2014) for the full mathematical
statement). In the one-dimensional model (d = 1) with quadratic voter utilities
and where i denotes voter is ideal point, the winning party is the one whose
platform is closest to the medians ideal point. Let H denote the distribution of
the medians ideal point. Party As probability of winning function is then
A(xA; xB) = H

xA + xB
2

;
since with quadratic utilities the indi¤erent voter prefers the policy which is half
way in between xA and xB.
Roemer (2001)s book contains three di¤erent ways to construct the probability
of winning function from prior assumptions, without building micro-foundations
for this uncertainty, at the individual voter level. These three di¤erent approaches
give modelers the ability to choose the one most-appropriate to the specic ap-
plication studied. The rst two specications assume a continuum of types. The
rst one, called the state space approach to uncertainty, is the one closest to the
micro-founded uncertainty presented above. Voters care only about policy, with
i denoting the type of the individual. There is a set of states S, with a proba-
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bility distribution . The distribution of voters preferences varies from one state
to another: for each state s 2 S, there is a probability measure Fs on the set of
types. This model can have several interpretations, the simplest one being that
citizenspreferences are known with certainty by parties, but that the set of actual
voters on election day may depend on the state of the world, such as the weather
conditions on that day. At the time of making policy proposals, both parties know
the distribution of voters preferences in each state, and the probability that each
state occurs, but they are uncertain as to which state will realize on election day.
We now show how to construct the probability of winning function from these
assumptions. The set of types who prefer policy x to y is denoted by 
(x; y). The
fraction of voters who prefer x to y is then denoted by Fs(
(x; y)). The set of
states where x beats y is
S(x; y) = fs 2 S jFs(
(x; y)) > 1=2g ;
so that the probability party A wins when it proposes x while B proposes y is
A(x; y) =  (S(x; y)) :
An alternative way to build macro uncertainty consists in assuming that parties
can compute their (deterministic) vote share as a function of partiesproposals,
but that they are uncertain as to the realization of these vote shares. With this
modelling strategy, we only need one distribution function F over the set of types.
The fraction of citizens who prefer policy x to y is given by F(
(x; y)), but the
parties are condent up to a margin of error of the true fraction, with the true
fraction being uniformly distributed over the interval [F(
(x; y)) ;F(
(x; y))+
] with  > 0. The probability that party A wins is then given by
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A(x; y) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if F(
(x; y)) +   1=2
F(
(x;y))+ 1=2
2
if 1=2 2 [F(
(x; y))  ;F(
(x; y)) + ]
1 if F(
(x; y))    1=2
The easiest interpretation of this error-distribution model is that parties are con-
dent about pre-election polls results (the computed expected vote share) up to
a certain margin of condence.
Finally, Roemer (2001) also proposes a nite type model of uncertainty, which
is more cumbersome to describe.
Observe that all variants of macro (and micro) uncertainty generate aggre-
gate uncertainty, with the expected electoral results being a random variable for
both parties when announcing their policy platforms. The main characteristic of
those approaches is that, unlike in the stochastic partisanship approach, both the
probability of winning and the vote share functions are discontinuous along the
diagonalwhen a party crosses over the other one by proposing the same policy.
Despite this discontinuity, there is a unique equilibrium in the case of unidimen-
sional policy space, where both parties propose the same policy (see Duggan 2006a
for the vote motivation, and Calvert 1985 for the win motivation). We refer to
Duggan (2014) for a more complete examination of the solutions under those two
forms of electoral motivation, and we turn to the much more developed analysis
of this model under policy motivations.
5.2 Purely policy motivated parties
We rst develop the analytical modelling, before moving to various applications.
15
5.2.1 Theory
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game is dubbed a Wittman equilib-
rium. The following proposition has been proved by in various guises by Wittman
(1983, 1990), Hansson and Stuart (1984), Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994):
Proposition 6 In the stochastic preference model with policy motivations and
d  1, if (xA; xB) is an equilibrium, then the candidates do not locate at the same
policy position: xA 6= xB.
The intuition for this proposition resides in the aggregate uncertainty gener-
ated by the stochastic preferences model. At the time of announcing their plat-
forms, parties face a trade-o¤ between increasing their probability of winning and
moving closer to their most-preferred policy. Since parties di¤er in their policy
preferences, they end up proposing di¤erent platforms. For instance, if d = 1 and
utilities are quadratic with ~xA < ~xB, we have that the equilibrium, if it exists, is
of the form ~xA < xA < x

B < ~xB.
Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994) further show that, if the policy space is
unidimensional (d = 1), the stochastic preferences model with policy motivation
gets close to Downsian, in the sense that the equilibrium policies (assuming equi-
librium existence) of both candidates converge to the median ideal policy as the
amount of noise added to the Downsian model goes to zero.
As for equilibrium existence, the good news is that the discontinuity of the
probability of winning function when both parties propose the same policy does
not translate into a discontinuous pay-o¤ function. The intuition is that the
discontinuity in j occurs when both parties propose the same policy, so that
the utility obtained by a party is anyway the same with both policies. On the
other hand, quasi-concavity of the pay-o¤ function is not guaranteed, so one needs
additional assumptions for equilibrium existence. These assumptions are not very
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strict in the case of a unidimensional policy space. For instance, Roemer (1997)
proves that a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium existence if d = 1 in the micro-
founded model described in section 5.1 is that the distribution of the median
ideal points among citizens be log concave. Roemer (2001, section 3.4) provides
a su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies with
d = 1 with the error-distribution model of uncertainty, and Roemer (1997) proves
a similar one for the state-space model. Unfortunately, these conditions are stated
in terms of the probability of winning function j, rather than in terms of the
data of the model. Roemer (2001, p.68) concludes that we nd that in most
interesting examples Wittman equilibria exist, but a truly satisfactory general
existence theorem is not known.
Su¢ cient conditions for existence are more di¢ cult to nd when d > 1 and,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no general proof of existence for multi-
dimensional policy spaces. As for the micro approach to uncertainty, Duggan
(2014, p.43) states that in higher dimensions, equilibria in the stochastic prefer-
ence model can fail to exist, while Roemer (2001, p.163) writes that all we can
say is that there is no guarantee that Wittman equilibrium exists when d > 1,
but if one does exist, it is probably generic.
Finally, observe that equilibria in mixed strategies exist, and that they are
continuous from the Downs model (in the sense that the support of any mixed
strategies equilibrium converges to the Downsian outcome as the amount of noise
tends toward zero, see more in Duggan, 2014).
5.2.2 Applications
Roemer (2001)s book contains many applications of this model to di¤erent policy
realms, where d = 1, including scal policy, partisan dogmatism and political
extremism, and political cycles. These models generate analytical predictions
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which can then be taken to the data, or are solved using calibrated numerical
simulations. Another example of policy application can be found in De Donder
and Hindriks (2007), who study the political economy of social insurance with
votersheterogeneity on two dimensions: income and risk levels. Individuals vote
over the extent of social insurance (d = 1), which they can complement on the
private market. They obtain equilibrium policy di¤erentiation with the Left party
proposing more social insurance than the Right party (the Right party attracts
the less risky and richer individuals, and the Left party attracts the more risky
and poorer individuals). In equilibrium, each party is tied for winning. They also
attempt at calibrating the model with real data, using U.S. data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics survey.
Roemer (2001, chapter 5) goes further and endogenizes the policy preferences
Uj(x) of the political parties. He assumes that each party represents the set of
citizens who vote for it in equilibrium (which he calls the partys membership).
Each party member receives an equal weightin the determination of party pref-
erences. He formalized this equal weightrequirement in two di¤erent manners.
The rst one, where each party represents its average member, can be applied
to multi-dimensional policy spaces, as we will see in section 5.3.2. The second
one can only be applied to unidimensional policy spaces, and assumes that party
members vote to elect their party representative, with this representative imposing
its preferences when competing electorally with the other party.
Finally, we are not aware of applications of the Wittman model to (i) multi-
dimensional policy spaces, and (ii) explaining the observed policy positions of
parties in past elections.
We now move to the case where parties care about both electoral and policy
considerations.
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5.3 Party members: opportunists and militants
Parties are formed by individuals who may have di¤erent motives for being in
the party. In this section we rst outline Roemers (2001) model in which there
are two party factions (the opportunists and the militants), then present some
applications of this model.
5.3.1 Theory
Roemer (2001) assumes that two factions coexist inside both political parties. In
each party j, the opportunists care exclusively about winning the elections (and
maximize j(xj; xk), j 6= k), while the militants care about the specic policy pro-
posal x which their party proposes (and maximize Uj(x)). Any of the approaches
mentioned in section 5.1 above can be used to model aggregate uncertainty (so
that j is not degenerate).
Both intra-party factions bargain with each other over the partys policy pro-
posal. Each faction has a complete preference order on the set of possible policies,
and Roemer assumes that the partys preference ordering is determined by the
intersection of these two orders. In other words, unanimity between the two fac-
tions is required for a party to accept a deviation from its current policy. This
unanimity rule determines the preferences (payo¤s) of the two parties who simul-
taneously choose their political platforms. A party unanimity Nash equilibrium
(PUNE) is a equilibrium of this game.
Denition 7 Assume that two parties, denoted A and B, compete in an election.
The policy pair (xA; xB) is a PUNE if and only if 8(j; k) 2 fA;Bg; j 6= k; @x 2 X
such that (i) Uj(x)  Uj(xj) and (ii) j(x; xk)  j(xj; xk), with at least one
strict inequality.
Roemer does not provide a general existence theorem for the PUNEs, but men-
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tions that PUNEs do exist in all the applications he has studied. The intuition for
why PUNEs exist (even in multidimensional policy spaces) is that the unanimity
requirement (between factions) restricts the set of admissible deviations for both
parties. Another way to put it is that the unanimity requirement means that each
partys preference ordering over policies is incomplete, since a party can only rank
policies if both its factions have the same ordering. Since deviations must fulll
the harsh requirement of pleasing both factions at the same time, the existence of
PUNEs in many environments becomes intuitive.
Roemer (2001) establishes that the PUNEs (when they exist) form a two-
dimensional manifold whatever the dimensionality of the policy space d  2. He
shows (Roemer 2001, section 8.3.) that the bargaining that takes place within
parties can be represented as a generalized Nash bargaining problem when ap-
propriate convexity properties hold. More precisely, take the threat point of this
intra-party bargaining game to be the situation which occurs when the other
party wins the election for sure. The Nash bargaining games between militants
and opportunists in party A and party B are given by
max
x2X
[A(x; xB)  0] [UA(x)  UA(xB)]1  ; and (3)
max
x2X
[B(xA; x)  0] [UB(x)  UB(xA)]1  (4)
where  and  measure the relative bargaining power of the opportunists in party
A and B respectively.
Roemer (2001) shows that a PUNE can be expressed as a pair of policies
(xA; xB) which solves equations (3) and (4) simultaneously for some values of
;  2 [0; 1]. The two-dimensional manifold of PUNEs can then be indexed by
these two variables,  and . It is important to note that we cannot be guar-
anteed that an equilibrium will exist for any pre-specied pair of numbers  and
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. Roemer (2001) shows that the specic case where both factions have the same
bargaining power in both parties ( =  = 1=2) corresponds to the Wittman equi-
librium, while the classical Downsian equilibrium (with purely policy motivated
parties) corresponds to  =  = 1.
5.3.2 Applications
The PUNE modelling approach has been applied to many di¤erent policy areas.
In several applications, the model delivers neat analytical predictions which are
valid for all PUNEs. In that sense, the multiplicity of PUNEs does not prevent
from obtaining sharp analytical predictions as seen in the following two examples.
Roemer (1999) studies electoral competition over quadratic taxes, and obtains
that all PUNEs exhibit marginal tax rates which increase with income. This
provides a positive foundation for the observation that income tax schedules are
progressive in most developed countries. Roemer (1998) supposes that the elec-
torate is concerned with two issues (taxation and, say, religion) and shows, under
certain conditions (namely, that the salience of the religious issue is su¢ ciently
large, that uncertainty is su¢ ciently small, and that the mean income of the co-
hort of voters who hold the median religious view is greater than mean income in
the population as a whole) that, in all PUNEs, both parties propose a tax rate of
zero! This result illustrates starkly the importance of non economicpreferences
in the democratic determination of the tax rates.
Lee and Roemer (2006) have applied this model to the race issue in the US, by
means of a calibration (for instance, the distribution of voter racism is estimated
from the American National Election Studies). They t the model to the data
for every presidential election in the period 1976-92 and achieve an excellent t.
Their objective goes beyond tting observed electoral data, since it consists in
conducting counterfactual experiments looking at how the equilibrium tax rates
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would be a¤ected by variations in the racist preferences of the US electorate.
They obtain that the marginal tax rate would increase by at least ten points,
were American voters not racist, making the US scal system much closer in size
to that of the northern European democracies. (Roemer 2006, p. 1026).
Another application is due to Cremer et al (2007) who study the PUNEs in
a model where both parties have to choose how much to tax a polluting good,
and the fraction of the tax proceeds to rebate based on the labor (as oppose to
capital) income of the constituents. They calibrate the model based on US data
(the polluting good being energy) and obtain two di¤erent sets of equilibria, one
with a tax on the polluting good and another with a subsidy.
Roemer (2001) extends the PUNE concept to the case where the militantsutil-
ity is endogenous, and is given by the average utility among the party members
(dened, as in section 5.2.2, as the set of citizens who vote for this party at equi-
librium). Roemer (2001, chapter 13) develops two applications of this PUNEEP
(where the last two letters stand for endogenous parties). The rst uses the Na-
tional Election Surveys to parametrize the preferences of the US polity when the
two-issue space consists of taxation and race. The second application endogenizes
parties in the model of progressive taxation mentioned above (Roemer, 2009).
While the PUNE approach has proved very fruitful in many applications to
specic policy areas, we are unaware of attempts to use this framework to replicate
generic policy positions of political parties in specic elections.
We have covered in section 4 above on stochastic partisanship the case where
voters disagree on the attractivity of exogenous, non-policy related characteristics
of political parties. The next section covers the case where they all agree that one
party has better characteristics than another.
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6 Valence models
Stokes (1963, 1992) seminal papers emphasized that the non-policy evaluations,
or valences, of candidates by the electorate are just as important as electoral pol-
icy preferences. He was particularly concerned with the fact that the Downsian
and policy motivated models with and without uncertainty did not do well when
taken to the data and argued that this evidence should allow theorists to modify
their models. Stokes proposed that there exist evaluativedimensions that he
termed valence issuesthat are fundamentally di¤erent from any policy positions
the parties may have, and that moreover do not a¤ect the distribution of parties
and voters. So that valence issues a¤ect voterselectoral choices independent of
the policies chosen by candidates. In Stokesworld, voters share the same beliefs
over valence issues such as reducing crime, increasing economic growth, or evalua-
tions of candidatescharacteristics such as integrity, charisma or competency. He
posited that candidates cannot a¤ect votersvalence beliefs during the election,
i.e., that votersvalence issues are independent of policy and are non-manipulable
by candidates. He also argued that while valence issues are exogenously given
to candidates at election time, they may vary across candidates, e.g., voters may
perceive candidates as di¤ering in ability to govern.
Stokes seminal papers led researchers to incorporate non-policy factors into
spatial models. We do not exhaustively cover all the valence models available
in the literature, rather we have chosen to pick di¤erent models illustrating the
variety of valence models available in the literature. We rst study the case of a
unidimensional policy space before moving to multidimensional spaces.
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6.1 Valence in unidimensional policy spaces
In this section, we assume that two parties compete electorally by simultaneously
choosing a policy in a one-dimensional policy space (d = 1). As in section 4, voters
care both for policies, and for the party which enacts those policies. Abusing
slightly notation, we have that
ui(x; j) =

ui(xA) + #A if j = A
ui(xD) + #D if j = D
: (5)
Unlike in section 4, the non-policy preference parameters vA and vD are common to
all voters. These represent the valence of the parties, and without loss of generality
assume that # = #A   #D > 0, so that party A (respectively, D) is valence-
advantaged (valence-disadvantaged), with # measuring the relative valence of A
compared to D. So that voter i votes for party A if ui(xA)  ui(xD) + # > 0.
Models with policy motivated parties where the electorate cares about both
policies and candidatesvalence may generate policy divergence, even in the ab-
sence of uncertainty (which is not the case without valence, see above Section
3). For instance, assume that ~xA < xm < ~xD where xm is the median voters
blisspoint. Suppose that A has a valence advantage over D which is such that A
wins the election unless
jxA   xmj > jxD   xmj+ y;
where y > 0. In words, party A is guaranteed to win if it locates within y units of
the median, and thus can move closer to her ideal point ~xA than xm. For instance,
if ~xA < xm   y, there is an equilibrium with xD = xm and xA = xm   y, so that
A wins for sure and D prevents A from moving further to the left.
We now introduce uncertainty into the model. Two ways of adding uncertainty
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have been studied in the literature: one over the electoral outcome, the other over
candidatesvalence. While we do not exhaustively cover the literature, we now
summarize some of results derived from valence models with uncertainty.
6.1.1 Uncertainty over election results
In this section we assume that candidates dont know the location of the median
voter but know the valence advantage of candidate A relative to D.
Groseclose (2001) extends the Calvert (1985) andWittman (1977, 1983) policy-
seeking two-candidate one-dimensional (d = 1) policy models by including valence
issues. He assumes that candidates care both about policy and holding o¢ ce and
standardizes the value candidates place on o¢ ce to one. The utility of the valence
advantaged candidate A is given by
UA =
8<: + (1  )	(j~xA   xAj) if A wins(1  )	(j~xA   xDj) if D wins
where	 is a decreasing and concave function. Candidates are win-motivated when
 = 1, policy-motivated when  = 0 or have mixed motives when 0 <  < 1.
The simplest model has a representative (or median) voter with an ideal point
xm 2 < with preferences over the policy and valence characteristics of the can-
didates as in (5).9 The median voters ideal pointunknown to candidates is
drawn from a continuous distribution symmetric about zero with density f() and
distribution F () known to both candidates. This voter votes for A if
#+ (jxm   xAj) > (jxm   xDj):
where  is a decreasing and concave function.
9The model can easily be generalized to the case of many voters with varying ideal points in
the unidimensional policy space, since a party wins if and only if the median voter votes for it.
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When candidates care only about winning and there is no valence advantage,
i.e.,  = 1 and # = 0, then Groseclose re-states Calverts (1985) result in Propo-
sition 8 (i) and shows in part (ii) that, with purely o¢ ce motivated parties, the
introduction of even an innitesimal valence destroys equilibrium existence.
Proposition 8 (i)When  = 1 and # = 0. The unique equilibrium is xA = x

D =
xm = 0. (ii) When  = 1 and V > 0, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The intuition behind the non-existence result in Proposition 8 (ii) is simple.
While candidate A prefers to adopt the same policy as D to capitalize on its
valence advantage so as to win with certainty, D has to move away from A to have
even a small chance at winning. Hence, no matter what positions the candidates
adopt, at least one wants to move. This reasoning extends to the case of multi-
dimensional policy spaces (d > 1), and to the vote motivation objective. This
illustrates the knife-edge quality of the Downs and Wittman results when valence
is introduced. We refer the reader to the appendix for a brief survey of papers
dealing with Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in that setting.
Groseclose (2001) then focuses on the case where candidates care about policy
and o¢ ce (i.e.,  < 1), and where their ideals are symmetrically located about the
median voters expected ideal point, i.e., ~xA =  ~xD. He focuses on the symmetry
of bliss points essentially for analytical convenience and notes that this assumption
is reasonable when each party represents one half of the electorate, when parties
most-preferred policies are the ideal points of their median members, and when
voters preferences are distributed symmetrically.
Groseclose (2001) does not provide any existence or uniqueness result, but
rather characterizes the equilibrium in pure strategies, assuming it exists. His
numerical results show the existence of at most one such equilibrium (but no
equilibrium when  is large and V small, which is not surprising in the light of
Proposition 8). He obtains the following results.
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Proposition 9 For very general forms of 	(), () and f() the following six
relations hold (no proof is given of relation 5). (i) As As valence advantage
increases, divergence among candidates policies increases. (ii) As As valence
advantage increases from 0 to a small amount, A moves towards the expected me-
dian. (iii) However, as As advantage increases beyond a certain point, A adopts
a more extreme position closer to her ideal point. (iv) As As valence advantage
increases from 0 to a small positive amount, D moves away from the expected
median. (v) Ds equilibrium location moves away from the expected median as
As valence advantage increases. (vi) For all levels of As valence advantage, As
policy is more moderate than Ds.
The key characteristic of the modelling which explains those results is that
election uncertainty increases when parties diverge (at the opposite, when both
propose very similar policies, A is sure to win the election). The intuition for
results (ii) (dubbed the moderating frontrunnere¤ect) and (iv) (the extrem-
ist underdog e¤ect) is as follows. The equilibrium policy of a party trades-o¤
centripetal incentives (moving closer to the center to increase its probability of
winning) and centrifugal incentives (moving away from the center to increase its
utility in case of a win). Increasing As valence advantage from zero moves the
cut-point voter (the one indi¤erent between both parties) further away from As
policy, and closer to Ds policy. If the votersutilities are concave enough, this
means that the (absolute value of the) marginal utility of the cut-point voter in-
creases at the policy proposed by A, and decreases at the policy proposed by D.
This reinforces the centripetal force for A, and decreases it for D, resulting in
both parties moving in the direction of Ds ideal policy.10
10Adams, Merrill and Grofman (AMG, 2005, chapter 11) stress that the extremist underdog
e¤ect requires a level of uncertainty over the location of the median voter which is not empirically
reasonable, at least in US elections (see section 7.3). Note that AMG (2005) assume that voters
have quadratic preferences, while Grosecloses su¢ cient condition for the extreme underdog
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Part (3) of Proposition 9 is proved by showing that, when its valence advantage
becomes innite, party A locates at its preferred policy ~xA and wins for sure.
Beyond proving part (6), Groseclose also proves the counter-intuitive result that
if party A has a large valence advantage then party D may propose at equilibrium
a policy which is more extreme than its blisspoint ~xD! The intuition is that, when
# is large, the cut-point voter is located at a more extreme position than Ds
proposed policy (even when D proposes its favored policy ~xD). In that case, D
has an incentive to propose a more extreme position, trading o¤ a rst-order gain
in winning probability for a second-order loss in utility in case it wins the election.
As Groseclose (2001) writes relations 2, 4, 5 and 6 [in Proposition 9] are
somewhat unintuitive, since instead, one might expect that valence-advantaged
candidates would parlay their advantage into a position that they personally fa-
vor more and disadvantaged candidates would do the opposite. However, notwith-
standing this, the results have strong empirical support. First, they are consistent
with Fiorinas (1973) evidence against the marginality hypothesis.(...) Fiorina
ndsdespite the conventional wisdom of congressional scholars of the 1950s and
1960sthat electorally strong incumbents tend to moderate more than electorally
weak incumbents. (p 874). Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) also nd
empirically that high-quality US House candidates adopt more moderate positions
than low-quality ones.
We now move to the case where the uncertainty pertains to the valence ad-
vantage of candidates, rather than directly to the elections results.
6.1.2 Uncertainty over valence
Londregan and Romer (1993) develop a two-party valence model of congressional
elections in which parties are represented by candidates at the constituency level.
e¤ect to appear is that voters preferences are more concave than in the quadratic case (with a
negative third derivative).
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Candidates have divergent preferences over the unidimensional (d = 1) policy
space and di¤er in their ability to deliver constituency services, with abilities,
A and D, drawn independently of each other from a joint density function
(A; D) > 0 with cumulative density (A; D). Let   (A; D) denote the
vector of abilities. Voters prefer candidates with higher abilities who can deliver
higher constituency services.
While parties only have noisy signals about candidatesabilities at the candi-
date selection stage, candidates abilities are perfectly known to voters at election
time. Parties are then unsure as to the electoral outcome when choosing their
platforms as they do so before votersobserve candidatesabilities.
At the beginning of the game, each party observes a signal of candidatesability
and selects one candidate to represent it in the election with the partys policy
being that of the chosen candidate. Let (xA; xD) denote the partiesplatforms.
With a continuum of voters whose preferences satisfy the single crossing condi-
tion, the election is determined by the choice of the median voter. Partiesknow
the location of the median voters ideal point and know that the post-election
constituency services provided by the winning candidate depends on her ability.
Given platforms, (xA; xD), the median voters utility, after observing candi-
datesabilities, is given by
um(xj; j) =  d(xm; xj) + #(j);
where  measures the importance voters give to the constituency services and
#(j)an increasing function in jdenotes the constituency services provided
by candidate j. Since #(j) is the same across voters and is independent of
candidatespolicies, it ts our denition of valence, except that in this model #j
increases in candidate js ability.
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The median voter votes for A when um(xA; A) > um(xD; D), i.e., when
#(A; D)  #A(A)  #D(D) > 1

[d(xm; xA)  d(xm; xD)] :
So that the median votes for A when the valence gap between A andD, #(A; D),
is large enough. Since at the platform selection stage parties view #(A; D) as a
random variable, the ex-ante probability that A wins the election is given by the
probability that the median votes for A, i.e.,
A(xA; xB;) = Pr [um(xA; A) > um(xD; D)]
= Pr

#(A; D) >
1

[d(xm; xA)  d(xm; xD)]

where d(xm; xj) for j = A;D measures the distance between the median voters
ideal, xm, and the partys policy xj.
For each pair of policy platforms (xA; xD) and each pair of median voter pref-
erences (xm; ), there is a valence gap #(A; D) that leaves the median voter
indi¤erent between voting for either candidate.
Candidate js expected utility, after the two parties have chosen their candi-
dates but before abilities are revealed, is given by
Uj(xA; xD) =  A(xA; xB;)d(~xj; xA)  [1  A(xA; xB;)]d(~xj; xD)
where d(~xj; xA) and d(~xj; xD) measure the distance between candidate js policy
and the policy implemented by the wining candidate. Candidates, who are policy
motivated, choose their policy platforms to maximize their expected utility.
Londregan and Romer (1993) prove the following proposition:
Proposition 10 (i) There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which candi-
dates adopt the same platform, i.e., xA 6= xD. (ii) Moreover, xA and xD will lie
30
outside an interval that contains the median voters ideal policy with this interval
increasing as  increases.
Proposition 10 (i) says that the partys equilibrium policies diverge. This
divergence is generated by divergence in the partys policy preferences, by the
uncertainty parties have on candidatesabilities and by the trade-o¤ voters face
between policies and the ability of candidates to deliver better constituency ser-
vices. Proposition 10 (ii) says that as  increases, so that voters become more
service-motivated, policy polarization increases and policies become more extreme.
Intuitively, given the distribution of abilities, as  increases, parties become more
uncertain about the level of constituency services candidates will provide to vot-
ers and so become more uncertain about how voters evaluate candidates. Thus,
Proposition 10 provides a minimum bound of the valence advantage that A must
have over D for there to be an equilibrium and shows that the bound increases as
voters give greater importance to valence issues.
The one testable hypotheses emanating from their model is that policy po-
larization increases in the saliency voters place on constituency services. Their
empirical tests nd no support for this hypothesis in the 1978 US National con-
gressional election perhaps due to the small number of open seats in the election.
Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005, chapter 11.3) propose a similar but simpler
model, where the valence advantage of party A is # = v + , with v the expected
valance advantage, and where  is distributed according to a normal distribution
with mean zero and standard deviation v. They rst show that, if an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists with v = 0, ~xA =  ~xD and xA =  xD, then there is
substantial candidate divergence. They then compute numerically the equilibrium
with v > 0. They obtain that the divergence between parties increases with both
v and v. Moreover, both xA and x

D shift to the left (closer to ~xA) when v
increases. This is in stark contrast with the results from the preceding section.
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Results remain qualitatively similar when parties have mixed (policy and electoral)
motivation, rather than being purely policy-motivated.
6.2 Valence in multidimensional policy spaces
We now present multidimensional spatial competition models in which voters
also rank candidates along a valence dimension. These valence models derive the
conditions under which a d-dimensional party positioning equilibrium exists even
when the necessary conditions for a Condorcet winner do not hold. This is in
sharp contrast with the generic non-existence results in multidimensional models
without valence described in Proposition 2 .
6.2.1 Ansolabehere and Snyders win-seeking policy-valence model
In their multidimensional two-candidate valence model, Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2000) present the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of equilibrium
and characterize the equilibria when candidates care only about winning o¢ ce
in a model with no uncertainty except for ties broken in a fair manner. As An-
solabehere and Snyder state: when one candidate has a large enough valence
advantage that candidate wins the election irrespective of candidatespositions,
meaning that equilibria in multidimensional policy spaces with valence always
exist. Their contribution to this literature is to show that the yolk,11 which
sets limits on the uncovered set (McKelvey 1986; Cox 1987), bounds the set of
equilibria in these valence models.
Given votersvalences (#A; #D), o¢ ce-seeking candidates A and D simultane-
ously choose their policies xA and xB to maximize their expected payo¤,
11The yolkis usually a small, centrally located set (McKelvey, 1986; Feld et al, 1988).
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Vj(xA; #A;xD; #D) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if nj > nk
1=2 if nj = nk
0 if nj < nk
for j and k in A;D and where nA (respectively nD) is the measure of voters that
prefer A (D) to D (A).
Given candidatesd dimensional policies and valences, (xA; #A;xD; #D), voter
is utility from candidate j is given by
ui(xj;#j; exi; ) = #j  k xj   exi k2= #j   (xj   exi)0(xj   exi)
where is ideal policies, exi, and candidate js policies, xj, are d-dimensional vec-
tors, k  k is the Euclidean distance and  represents the importance voters give
to the valence issue. Voters indi¤erent between A and B are those for whom
the utility di¤erence from the two candidates, ui(xA; #A;xD; #D), is zero with
ui(xA; #A;xD; #D) = 0 dening a hyperplane that is orthogonal to xD   xA.
Using the set of median hyperplanes of votersideal points, Ansolabehere and
Snyder derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an equi-
librium, giving bounds to the set of equilibria in terms of the yolkthe smallest
ball that intersects all median hyperplanesso that when c is the center of the
yolk and r its radius, they prove the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Suppose #A > #D. Then (xA;xD) is an equilibrium if and only
if (i) the maximum distance between the ideal point of any voter and any median
hyperplane is bounded above by
p
(#A   #D). (ii) r <
p
(#A   #D). Moreover,
if (xA;xD) is an equilibrium, then k xA   c k< r +
p
(#A   #D).
Note that the equilibria place no restrictions on the strategies of the low valence
candidate but require that voters ideal points be close enough to any median
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hyperplane. Proposition 11 shows, however, that unless As valence advantage
is large, then As policy position must be near the yolk. If candidates maximize
their vote share, rather than their probability of winning o¢ ce, then equilibria
typically do not exist unless one candidate has a very large valence advantage.
Intuitively, as in the one dimensional policy space, while the valence advantaged
candidate A wants to be at Ds position, D being valence disadvantaged has an
incentive to locate at a di¤erent point than A in order to win some votes. This is
true unless votersideal points are all within
p
(#A   #D) of xD.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) shows that even without imposing institutions
that restrict choices in a multi-dimensional policy model with valence and no
uncertainty, an equilibrium exists when A has a large enough valence advantage
over D. A wins the election regardless of candidateslocation in the policy space.
They conclude that pure strategy Nash equilibria in multidimensional spatial
models can exist and that valence politics and positional politics are inseparable
as valence issues are just one aspect of elections that a¤ect candidatespositions.
While advantaged candidates take moderate positions, disadvantaged ones may
take moderate or extreme positions. They suggest that these results are related to
three empirical observations. (1)The personal vote, when voters favor a particular
candidatedue, for example, to credit-claiming, campaign spending, etc.is just
a valence issue. (2) Party domination in certain periods may be due to the
partys superior valence on these issues during this period (e.g., less corrupt, more
likely to maintain a strong stable economy, better able to provide foreign policy
leadership). (3) Partisan policy realignments are triggered by large changes in
valence issues, e.g., due to the partiesperceived performances on a given set of
valence issues or to changes in the weight voters place on di¤erent valence issues.
e.g., the fall in parties credibility during severe economic crises.
We now examine a valence model where candidates cannot observe voters
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individual valences and so are uncertain as to the electoral outcome.
6.2.2 Schoelds win-seeking policy-valence model
Schoeld (2007) introduces valence asymmetries among candidates into a mul-
tidimensional multi-candidate model where candidates choose their policies to
maximize their vote shares. Given the on-going debate about whether candidates
converge or not to the electoral mean12 in many electoral systems (e.g., US, and
many European countries), Schoelds model studies the conditions under which
candidates converge to the electoral mean.
Candidates j 2 C = f1; 2; :::; cg simultaneously announce the d-dimensional
policies xj 2 X before the election, with x = (x1; :;xj; ::;xc) denoting the matrix
of candidatespolicies.
Given x, voter is utility vector, for i 2 N = f1; 2; ::; ng is given by
ui(x;#;exi) = (ui(x1; #1; exi); ::; ui(xj; #j; exi); ::; ui(xc; #c; exi))
where ui(xj; #j; exi)    k exi   xj k2 +#j + ij = ui (xj; #j; exi) + ij (6)
and exi is voter is d-dimensional ideal point,  the importance voters give to
the policy dimensions and k  k the Euclidean norm on X. Voter is valence for
candidate j is given by #j + ij where js mean valence, #j, is common to all
voters and exogenously given with voter is idiosyncratic valence component, ij,
varying around #j according to a Type I extreme-value distribution with mean
zero and variance =6. The mean valence vector # = (#1; ::; #j; ::; #p) is such that
#1 < :: < #j < :: < #c, so that candidate 1 is the one with the lowest mean valence.
The term ui (xj; #j; exi) represents the observable component of is utility, meaning
that, parties know the mean valence vector # but not the random component, ij,
12The electoral mean is the d-dimensional vector of votersideal policies in each dimension.
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in votersutility and so are unsure about the electoral outcome.
Given parties policies, x, and since the idiosyncratic component in voter is
valence is stochastic, the probability that i votes for j is given by
ij(x) = Pr[ui(xj; #j; exi) > ui(xh; #h; exi) for all h 6= j 2 C]
i.e., given by the probability that voter i gets a higher utility for j than from any
other party. With votersidiosyncratic valences, ij for all i 2 N , drawn from a
Type I extreme-value distribution, the probability that i votes for j has a logit
specication, i.e., is given by
ij(x) =
exp[ui (xj; #j; exi)]Xc
k=1
exp[ui (xk; #k; exi)] (7)
Candidate j maximizes its expected vote share, i.e., maximizes
Vj(x)  1
n
X
i2N
ij(x) (8)
with V(x) = (Vj(x); for all j 2 C) denoting the prole of candidatesexpected
vote shares functions.
Dene the electoral mean as the mean of voters ideal points, i.e., x0 =
1
n
X
i2N
xi with the joint electoral mean given by x0 = (x0; ::;x0) that can be
standardized to zero, so that x0 = 0 = (0; ::;0) denotes the joint electoral mean.
Schoeld points out that in political models, the eigenvalues of the Hessian of
the partiesvote share functions at the critical equilibriumthose satisfying the
rst order conditionmay be positive for one of the parties impliying that the ex-
pected vote share functions of such a candidate fails pseudo-concavity. Since none
of the usual xed point arguments can be used to assert existence of a global
pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), he uses the concept of a critical Nash equilibrium
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(CNE), namely a vector of strategies which satises the rst-order condition for
a local maximum of candidatesexpected vote share functions. Moreover, as he
points out standard arguments based on the index, together with transversality
arguments can be used to show that a CNE will exist and that, generically, it will
be isolated. A local Nash equilibrium (LNE) satises the rst-order condition,
together with the second-order condition that the Hessians of all candidates are
negative (semi-) denite at the CNE. Clearly, the set of LNE will contain the PNE.
The su¢ cient (necessary) condition for parties to converge to the electoral mean
is that the eigenvalues of the Hessian of second order partial derivatives of can-
didatesvote share functions, when evaluated at the electoral mean, be negative
(semi-)denite. Schoeld shows that the necessary and su¢ cient condition can be
summarized in what he calls the convergence coe¢ cient that we now dene.
Denition 12 Suppose all parties locate at the electoral mean, x0. The probability
that voters choose party 1, 1, with the lowest valence, using (7), is given by
1(x0;#) =
hXc
k=1
exp[#k   #1]
i 1
(9)
and the convergence coe¢ cient of the election, c(#; ; 2), by
c(#; ; 2)  2(1  21)2; (10)
where 1(x0;#) is given by (9) and 
2 
Xd
s=1
var(s) denotes the sum of the
variance of votersideal points along each dimension with var(s) being the variance
of votersideal points along dimension s.
If parties locate at x0, 1(x0;#) in (9) depends only on the valence advantage
that the top c  1 candidates have over the lowest valence candidate, candidate 1,
is independent of candidatespolicies and votersideal points, so is the same for
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all voters and gives candidate 1s expected vote share at x0.
Schoeld (2007) proves the following Proposition.
Proposition 13 Let voter is idiosyncratic valence, ij for all i 2 N , follow a
Type I extreme-value distribution. (i) The joint electoral mean, x0 satises the
rst order conditions. (ii) The necessary and su¢ cient condition for x0 to be a
LNE is that the matrix 2(1 21)r has negative eigenvalues where r is the dd
variance-covariance matrix of voters ideal points. (iii) When the convergence
coe¢ cient is smaller than the dimension of the policy space, i.e., c(#; ; 2) 6 d,
the necessary condition for convergence to x0 has been met by all parties. The
joint electoral mean, x0, is a LNE of the election. (iv) If c(#; ; 2) > d, the
necessary condition for convergence to x0 has not been met by at least one party.
The joint electoral mean, x0, is not a LNE of the election and at least one party
locates far from the electoral mean. (v) If d = 2 and c(#; ; 2) 6 1, the su¢ cient
condition for convergence to x0 is met by all parties and the joint electoral mean,
x0, is LNE of the election.
Proposition 13 predicts that if an equilibrium exists at the electoral mean, all
parties adopt the same position, the electoral mean, i.e., candidatesequilibrium
policies are the mean of votersideal policies. The proposition also highlights that
when candidatesdi¤er in their valences, an equilibrium in which all candidates
convergence to, or locate at, the electoral mean exists when c(#; ; 2) < d. The
convergence coe¢ cient, c(#; ; 2) in (10), increases in  and 2 and decreases
in 1. In particular, when the valence advantage of the top c   1 candidates
increases relative to that of the most valence disadvantaged candidate, candidate
1, i.e., when the di¤erence between #1 and f#2; #3; ::; #cg increases, the probability
voters choose candidate 1 with the lowest valence when located at the electoral
mean, 1(x0;#) in (9), decreases. As a consequence, candidate 1 will move away
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from the electoral mean x0 in order to increase its vote share, i.e., at x0 candidate
1s vote share is at a minimum or at a saddle point. This result says that as
the valence advantage of the top c   1 candidates relative to the most valence
disadvantaged candidate increases, the join electoral mean is less likely to be a
LNE of the election.
Note that c(#; ; 2) in (10) decreases when  decreases, i.e., when voters
give greater relative importance to the valence issue. It is then more likely that
c(#; ; 2) will be less than d, and thus more likely that all parties, including the
lowest valence party, adopt the same policies by locating at the electoral mean.
Thus, the greater the importance given to the valence issue the more likely it is
that candidates converge to the electoral mean, ceteris paribus.
Schoelds (2007) result deals with more than two candidates and highlights
that existence of an equilibrium at the electoral mean depends on candidatesva-
lences, on the importance voters give to policies (and indirectly to the importance
voters give to the valence issue) and on how dispersed voters are in the policy
space. Schoelds result is similar to that of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000)
given in Proposition 11 when candidates have policy rather than win-motivation
and contrasts with the non-existence results in the non-valence multidimensional
models given in Proposition 2 in Section 3. In addition, Schoelds results also
points out that convergence to the electoral mean depends on the probability
that voterschose the candidate with the lowest valence. When c(#; ; 2) > d,
Proposition 13 says that parties locate away from the electoral origin.
6.2.3 Theoretical extensions of Schoelds (2007) model
Schoelds (2007) model has been extended to examine partiesequilibrium poli-
cies when voters in di¤erent regions of the country face di¤erent sets of parties
while allowing voters to have sociodemographic valences, i.e., allowing voters
39
propensities to vote for the various candidates to depend on their sociodemo-
graphic characteristics (age, gender, education,...). Gallego et al (2014) develop a
model with national and regional parties. In the model, one party runs only in one
region (e.g., the Bloc Quebecois in Quebec) with national parties competing in all
regions to study the e¤ect that this regional party has on the electoral outcome
in that region and on the national partiespositions in that region and in the rest
of the country. Labzina and Schoeld (2015) adapt this regional model to study
a country with three regions in which there are two regional parties competing
in two di¤erent regions and three national parties competing in all regions. In
these regional models, votersutilities depend on the region in which they live
and the parties competing in that region. The conditions for convergence to the
regional electoral mean are similar to those in Schoeld (2007) given in Section
6.2.2, convergence at the national level requires convergence in every region.
Gallego and Schoeld (2016a) extend Schoelds (2007) model to study the
e¤ect that advertising has on the policy position of US Presidential candidates.
Voters are charactretized by their policy preferences and by their campaign toler-
ance levelthe number of times they want to be contacted by candidatesand by
three exogenously given valences: sociodemographic (age, income, etc.) and com-
petency valences as well as by candidatestraits valences (candidatescharisma,
age, race, etc.). The model shows that in spite of the fact that the one-person-
one-vote principle applies, candidates weight voters di¤erently in their policy and
advertising campaigns, giving higher weights to undecided voters and little or no
weight to voters who vote with high probability for any candidate. Moreover, like
in Schoelds (2007) model, the valence advantage of the top c   1 candidates
relative to the lowest valence candidate a¤ects convergence to votersweighted
mean policy and campaign tolerance levels.
Gallego and Schoeld (2016b) extend the Gallego and Schoeld (2016a) model
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to examine the e¤ect that campaign advertising has on the policy positions in US
Presidential elections at both the state and the national levels when di¤erences
across states matter. Candidateselectoral campaign consists of their policy and
advertising campaign in each state and at the national level. Votersutility func-
tion depend on candidates campaign in their state of residence and at the national
level as well as on their sociodemographic, traits and competency valences with
valences having an idiosyncratic component, unobserved by candidates, drawn
from Type-I Extreme Value distributions. Convergence to the state weighted pol-
icy and campaign tolerance mean depends on the combined valence advantage of
the top c   1 candidates relative to the lowest valence candidate in that state
and national levels. Candidateselectoral state campaigns determine the electoral
campaign at the national level so that, convergence at the national level depends
on convergence in each state. If candidates converege to the weighted state and
national means, they weight undecided states more heavily than states voting
with high probability for any candidate. Thus, providing a theoretical foundation
for candidates spending more time and resources during the electoral campaign
in undecided states and shows the e¤ect that the combined state and national
valences have on convergence at the state and national levels.
6.2.4 Endogeneizing valence: political activists in Schoeld (2007)
Even though published earlier, Schoelds (2006) extends Schoelds (2007) multi-
dimensional multi-candidate model by allowing candidates to have both exogenous
and endogenous valences. The endogenous valence is generated by the contribu-
tions (of time and money) party activists make to candidates to inuence their
policy positions with candidates using these resources to present themselves more
e¤ectively to voters thus increasing their endogenous valence. Since activists have
more extreme positions than average voters, candidates must trade-o¤ adopt-
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ing the more radical policies demanded by activists against the loss of electoral
support due to these more extreme policies. Each party then must balance the
electoral and activists pulls.
In this extension, votersutility given in (6) changes to
ui(xj; Vj; exi)    k exi   x2j k2 +j(xj) + #j + ij = ui (xj; #j; exi) + ij (11)
where all the components are as in (6) and j(xj) represents the component of
valence generated by the activist contribution to candidate j.
Schoeld (2006) denes the balance solution as follows:
Denition 14 Let [ij]  [ij(x)] be the matrix of probabilities that voters vote
for candidate j and let [ij]  [ij(x)] = ij 
2
ijX
i2N
ij 2ij
be the weight candidate j
gives to voter i at policy vector x. The balance equation for candidate js policy
vector xj is given by
xj =
1
2
dj
dxj
+
X
i2N
ijexi: (12)
Dene the weighted electoral mean of candidate j by
X
i2N
ijexi = dEjdxj . The
balance equation in (12) can be re-written as

dEj
dxj
  xj

+
1
2
dj
dxj
= 0
where the term is square brackets measures the marginal electoral pull of candidate
j, a gradient pointing towards the weighted electoral mean with the electoral pull
being zero at the weighted electoral mean. The second term,
dj
dxj
, measures the
marginal activist pull of candidate j.
If xj satised the balance equation for all j, then x
 gives candidates equilib-
rium balanced policy positions.
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Note that if j(zj) = 0 for all j 2 C, then we are back in Schoelds (2007)
exogenous valence model. Schoeld (2006) proves the following proposition.
Proposition 15 Let the stochastic valence component in votersutility function
in (11) have a Type I extreme-value distribution in the model with exogenous and
activist valences. (i) The rst order condition for x to be an local strict Nash
Equilibrium is that it is a balance solution. (ii) If all activist valence functions
are highly concave, in the sense of having negative eigenvalues of su¢ ciently great
magnitude, the balance solution will be a Pure Nash Equilibrium of the election.
Schoelds (2006) endogenous valence model highlights that if the activists
valence functions are su¢ ciently concave, there exists a strict LNE in which d-
dimensional policies balancing the activist and electoral pulls. With their re-
sources activist pull policies away from the electoral mean by providing resources
that candidatesuse to increase their endogenous valence.
We now discuss empirical applications of Schoelds (2007) valence models.
6.2.5 Empirical applications of Schoeld-type valence models
The empirical literature provides substantial evidence that valence components
contribute in a signicant way to an understanding of voter choice. For example,
Clarke, Kornberg and Scotto (2009) and Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley
(2005), Clarke, Scotto and Kornberg (2011) and Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod and
Scotto (2005) study the e¤ect that electoral perceptions of leaderscharacter traits
have on British, Canadian and US elections. From their analysis for Britain, they
conclude that electoral responses
... were a reection largely of [the] changing perceptions of the
decision-making competence of the main political parties and their
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leaders. At any point in time, [the] preferences were strongly inu-
enced by their perceptions of the capacity of the rival parties the
putative alternative governments of the day to solve the major pol-
icy problems facing the country.
Thus, valenceas measured by votersperceptions of the candidatesor party
leaders character traitsmatter in electoral outcomes. Clarke, Kornberg and
Scotto (2009: 159) test the Downsian or pure spatial stochastic model and
a traits model of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections and conclude that
the two models have approximately equal explanatory power.
Taking this evidence seriously, Schoeld and co-authors used his 2007 model
to study elections in developed and developing countries under various political
regimes (presidential, parliamentary and anocratic13). The advantage of using
Schoelds (2007) model to study actual elections is that the model assumes that
votersidiosyncratic valence components come from Type-I Extreme value distri-
butions. The probability that a voter chooses any party has a Logit specication
and provides an easy transition to using empirical multinomial Logit (MNL) mod-
els to estimate the coe¢ cients in voter is utility functions in (6) in real elections.
In order to nd if there is an equilibrium at the electoral mean x0 in a particular
election, party js expected vote share function in (8) at x0 must be estimated
and this requires estimating the probability that voter i chooses candidate j in
(7) in the election. Estimating this probability requires nding estimates of the
components in voter is utility in (6): the importance voters give to the policy
dimension, , voter is ideal policy, exi, party js policy position, xj, and js
13In anocracies, a dictator governs alongside a legislature but exerts undue inuence on the
election. Anocracies lack important democratic institutions such as freedom of the press. Since
autocrats hold regular elections in an attempt to give their regime legitimacy, anocracies are also
called partial-democracies. Opposition parties participate in elections to become known political
entities and to communicate with voters. Even though their objective is to oust the autocrat
either in an election or through popular uprisings, the assumption is that they maximize their
vote share even when there is little chance of ousting the autocrat in the election.
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valence, #j for all voters and all parties, i.e., nding estimates of the parameters
in Schoelds model: (; exi;xj; #j) for all i 2 N and j 2 C.
The following procedure was used to estimate these parameters for the elections
shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below. Votersanswers to pre-election surveys were
used to estimate votersmultidimensional policy positions using factor analysis.14
The surveys also contain votersvoting intensions and their socio-demographic
characteristics. In the majority of elections studied by Schoeld and co-authors,
the factor analysis showed that there were two latent policy dimensions that were
important to voters during the election. These dimensions varied by country with
one usually related to economic matters and the other to some social issue such
as race or religion. Using the factor loadings from the factor analysis, voterstwo
dimensional ideal policy positions were estimated, exi. Since Schoelds (2007)
model predicts that when a LNE exists parties locate at the electoral mean, this
mean vector was calculated using the mean of votersideal policies, x0.
Using exi for all i 2 N and x0, a logit regression was used to estimate the
parameters (; #j for all j 2 C) in votersutility function in (6). The valence of
each party #j is given by the intercept of the utility function in the MNL regression
as it is independent of votersideal policies and parties policy positions. Using
these estimates and their signicance levels, the ranking of partiesvalences were
determined and the party with the lowest valence was identied.
Taking the estimates of (; exi;xj;#), the probability of voting for the lowest
valence party when parties locate at the electoral mean, 1(x0;#), was estimated
using (9). Using votersideal points, their variance, var(s), along each dimension
was used to calculate 2 
Xd
s=1
var(s), then using the estimates of (#; ; 2),
the convergence coe¢ cient, c(#; ; 2), given in (10) was calculated. Condence
intervals on all these estimates were derived using bootstrap methods on the idio-
14Factor analysis is a statistical method used to describe variability among observed, correlated
variables in terms of a potentially lower number of unobserved policy dimensions.
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syncratic valences in votersutility functions. The estimated convergence coe¢ -
cient and its condence interval was used to evaluate whether parties convergence
to electoral mean in each election using the results in Proposition 13.
The convergence coe¢ cient derived in various election studies carried out by
Schoeld and co-authors were used in Gallego and Schoeld (2013, 2015) to classify
political systems: Table 1 shows countries using Plurality Rule, Table 2 those using
Proportional Representation and Table 3 anocracies.15
Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here
Table 1 shows the derivation of the convergence coe¢ cient for the 2000, 2004
and 2008 US elections and for the 2005 and 2010 British elections, two countries
using Plurality rule in their electoral systems. The results for the US show that
the convergence coe¢ cients for the rst two elections were similar in value but
that it increased in 2008 when the variance in votersideal policies had increased
relative to the two previous elections. Given the condence intervals around the
value of the convergence coe¢ cient and using the result given in Proposition 13
it is clear that the convergence coe¢ cient is signicantly less than the dimension
of the policy space (d = 2) implying that the Republican and Democratic parties
converged to, or located, close to the electoral mean in each of these elections. A
similar result emerges when looking at the convergence coe¢ cients in the two UK
elections. Table 1 suggests that in countries using plurality rule, parties converge
to the electoral mean, meaning that the valence di¤erence between parties was
not large enough to generate policy divergence between them.
Table 2 gives the convergence coe¢ cient for elections in countries using pro-
portional representation. The convergence coe¢ cient in Israel and Poland are
15Tables 1, 2 and 3 are taken from Gallego and Schoeld (2013, 2015). We refer the reader
to Gallego and Schoelds papers for a more detailed analysis of each of these elections and for
references to the papers in which each of these elections are studied in great detail.
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signicantly above the dimension of the policy space (d = 2) in both countries
implying that in these countries with a large number of parties at least the low
valence parties found it in their interest to locate far from the electoral mean,
as using Proposition 13 it is clear that were they to locate at the electoral mean
their expected vote share would be very low (see Table 2). The dramatic change
in the convergence coe¢ cient in Turkey between the 1999 and 2002 elections (not
signicantly di¤erent from 2 in 1999 and signicantly greater than 2 in 2002) is
due to the electoral reform prior to 2002 implementing a high cut-o¤ rule. This,
coupled with a dramatic change in partiesvalences between the two elections,
led to a more fractionalized political system in 2002 as indicated by the values of
the convergence coe¢ cient. Table 2 then suggests that proportional representa-
tion leads to highly fractionalized political systems where parties do not converge
to the electoral mean. In particular, low valence parties prefer to locate in the
electoral periphery distinguishing themselves from larger mainstream parties and
do so to secure the votes of their core supporters.
Table 3 shows the value of the convergence coe¢ cient in the anocracies of
Georgia for the 2008 election, in Russia for the 2007 election and in Azerbai-
jan for the 2010 election. In all three elections the convergence coe¢ cient was
not signicantly di¤erent from the dimension of the policy space16 so that using
Proposition 13, the necessary condition for convergence to the mean is not sat-
ised. Thus, parties in these three anocracies are at a knife-edge equilibrium,
meaning that under some circumstances, parties converge to the mean, under
others they diverge. Which of these two equilibria materializes depends on the
valence/popularity of the President/autocrat and his party, on the other parties
valence and on the dispersion of voters in the policy space.
16In Azerbaijan, the factor analysis identied that voters in this election were only concerned
with only one policy dimension: demand for democracy.
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The general conclusion from Tables 1, 2 and 3, is that the convergence coef-
cient varies across elections, countries and political systems and can be used to
classify political systems. In addition, in more fractionalized polities, the valence
of the parties, in particular that of small parties, the weight voters give to the
policy dimensions and the dispersion of voters across the policy space are crucial
elements in determining whether there is convergence to the electoral mean.
Extensions of Schoelds (2007) model have also been taken to the data to
study the e¤ect that regional parties have in the regional and national elections.
In these models, the votersutilities depend on the region in which they live and
on the parties competing in that region. Gallego et al (2014) develop and test
a model of the Canadian 2004 federal election in which the Bloc Quebecois runs
only in Quebec. The model studies the e¤ect that the Blocs policy positions and
valence had on the electoral outcome in Quebec and how the anticipated outcome
in Quebec and the partiesvalences in Quebec and in the rest of Canada a¤ected
the policy positions all parties in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. Labzina
and Schoeld (2015) examine the 2010 British general election where the Scottish
National Party ran only in Scotland and Plaid Cymru only in Wales to study the
e¤ect that these two parties and their valences had on the policy positions of all
parties including the national parties (the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal
Democrats) who ran in Scotland, Wales and England.
The general conclusion of the empirical applications of Schoeld -type valence
models is that valence matters in determining the outcome of the election as
the size of the valence advantages of some candidates together with the impor-
tance voters give to the policy dimensions relative to the valence issues determines
whether there is convergence to the electoral mean in di¤erent elections in the same
country, across countries and across political regimes.
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7 The unied modelà la Adams-Merrill-Grofman
In their 2005 book, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (AMG hereafter) propose a
unied modelin which voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for
the parties enacting them. Their modelling of how voters care for parties, and
how this relates with their preferences for policies, is richer than what has been
developed in the preceding sections. Voters di¤er in their partisanship, with some
being closer to one party and others to another party. Moreover, the members
of one party have di¤erent preferences over the policy issues. AMG also add
a random component to the votersutility, as in section 4. We start with the
description of their model, including some analytical results that they obtain. We
then move to various empirical applications. Finally, AMG add a valence term to
their approach, as in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Section 7.3 presents some empirical
applications of their unied model with valence in unidimensional policy spaces.
7.1 Theory
There are J  2 political parties competing for the votes of n citizens by simulta-
neously proposing them policies in a d  1 policy space. Voter is most-preferred
location is denoted by the vector ~xi, with generic element k denoted by ~xik. Sim-
ilarly, party j proposes a vector xj with generic element xjk.
The utility of a voter i for party j proposing xj is given by
ui(xj; j) =  
Xd
k=1
ak(~xik   xjk)2 + bjtij + ij: (13)
The rst two components of the utility function are assumed to be observable,
while ij is a random variable (from the point of view of parties). The rst com-
ponent denotes the utility that voter i derives from policy xj, and is given by the
Euclidean distance between proposed and most-preferred policy. The parameter
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ak measures the salience of policy dimension k, and is the same for all voters. The
vector tij measures non-policy variables, with coordinate tijl for voter i, party j
and non-policy variable l. For instance, it can measure partisanship, and take a
value of one if voter i identies with party j, and zero otherwise. The vector bj of
parameters has coordinates bjl, measuring the salience of non-policy issue l when
voting for party j so that the non-policy contribution to voter is utility is
bjtij =
X
l
bjltijl:
An important aspect of this formulation is that it allows policy preferences to
depend on the vector of non-policy variables tij (for instance, as we will show in
a moment, AMG assume that the distribution of blisspoints ~xi may di¤er among
the partisans of di¤erent parties).
AMG assumes that the random variables ij are independently generated from
a type I extreme-value distribution. Denote by ui (xj; j) the observable component
of voter is utility when voting for party j, i.e.,
ui (xj; j) =  
Xd
k=1
ak(~xik   xjk)2 + bjtij:
The probability that i votes for j has a logit specication and is given by
ij(xj; x j) =
exp[ui (xj; j)]PJ
j0=1 exp[u

i (xj0 ; j
0)]
:
Party js expected vote is the sum of the voting probabilities across voters,17
EVj(xj; x j) =
Xn
i=1
ij(xj; x j);
17There is no aggregate uncertainty if the number of voters n is su¢ ciently large.
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so that parties maximize their expected vote share EVj.
AMG provides theoretical results when d = 1, in which case
ui(xj; j) =  a(~xi   xj)2 + btij + ij;
where tij is a binary party identication variable.
They assume that a proportion mj of voters identies with party j. Among
those voters, the distribution of blisspoints ~xi is represented by a density function
fj with mean j. A fraction m0 of voters are independent, meaning that they
do not identify with any party. The overall mean of the blisspoints distribution is
V , and AMG assume that the average blisspoint of the independents equals V
(they check empirically that is is the case when they put the model to the data).
AMG (2005, appendix 4.1) have an existence (and uniqueness) theorem, pro-
vided that a condition on endogenous variables is satised. Their theorem does
not specify what the equilibrium policies are in equilibrium. Rather, they provide
an algorithm to compute the equilibrium policies numerically. We now list the
main characteristics of these equilibrium policies, starting with the simplest cases.
When b = 0, we are back to the stochastic partisan approach (section 4) with a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies where all parties propose the centrist policy
V when a is close to zero. If a is larger than zero, then this equilibrium may
not be unique. It is worth emphasizing that this result holds for J  2 i.e.,
with more than two parties! If J = 2, we obtain a unique equilibrium with policy
convergence to V even if b > 0 (provided that a is close to zero). This in some
sense generalizes the results obtained for the probabilisticapproach.
More generally, if J  3, b > 0 and a tends towards zero, then parties propose
policies which are located in between the centrist position (V ) and the average
position of their partisans (k). The reason why vote-seeking candidates shift away
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from the center in the direction of their partisans is that the marginal change in a
candidates probability of attracting her own partisansvotes via policy appeals is
higher than the marginal change in her probability of attracting a rival candidates
partisans.
AMG also provide comparative statics analysis of their model. They rst
obtain that increasing a (the salience of policy issue) and 2V (the dispersion of
policy preferences) both lead to more dispersed policies. They obtain the same
qualitative impact when partisans of party j become more extreme (as measured
by average preferred policy j) and when they become more numerous (larger j).
This is important, because more extreme parties often have fewer partisans, so
that the two e¤ects go in opposite directions. As we will see with the empirical
applications to France and Norway, this leads to predictions that extreme parties
(such as the communists and the Front National in France, or the Progress party
in Norway) should have, in equilibrium, less extreme policy positions than more
moderate parties! The impact of increasing b (the salience of partisanship) is am-
biguous, but for empirically reasonable values of the parameters a larger value of
b should lead to more extreme parties. Also, increasing the number of parties, J ,
should make policy proposals more extreme for existing parties. Finally, increas-
ing the fraction of independent voters (m0) should lead to more centrist policy
proposals (as, at the limit, if all voters are independent, all parties converge to
the centrist policy V ).
The AMG (2005) model is similar to Schoelds (2007), as both predict con-
vergence to the electoral centre. For uniqueness of the equilibrium, AMG require
that the weighted sum of voters ideals be contained within an open ball. In
Schoelds model the convergence condition di¤ers, since the requirement is that
the convergence coe¢ cient be less that the dimension of the policy space, d. Like
in the AGM model, convergence in Schoelds model depends on the variance
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of votersideals along all dimensions but in addition depends on the importance
voters give to the policy dimensions, , and on the probability that voters chose
the lowest valence party, 1(z0;#) in (9) which in turn depends on the valence
di¤erences between the top and lowest valence candidates. It is the interaction of
these three factors through the convergence coe¢ cient that determines whether
there is convergence to the mean in Schoelds (2007) model. If the distribution
of votersideals is too dispersed along any dimension, i.e., high 2, or if the prob-
ability that voters chose the lowest valence party, party 1 is high, a high 1(z0;#),
or if voters care a lot about policies, high , then there is no convergence to the
electoral mean.
We now turn to two applications of this unied model to party positioning in
elections hold in 1988 in France and in 1989 in Norway.
7.2 Applications of the unied model
7.2.1 France 1988 presidential elections
AMG (2005) study the 1988 presidential elections in France. They concentrate
on the ve most prominent candidates (representing the extreme left, left, center
right, right and extreme right parties on the left-right dimension) and on the rst
round of the election.
They use the answers to Pierces 1988 Presidential Election Study by the 748
respondents who have voted in the rst round of the election. These respondents
position themselves and the 5 candidates on four di¤erent scales numbered from
1 to 7 (so that d = 4): (1) the classical left-rightone, (2) an immigration scale,
(3) a public sector size scale and (4) a church school scale. They compute the
average position of the 5 candidates on the 4 scales and obtain the same ordering
on all 4 scales.
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They rst test what they call the policy only modelwhich corresponds to
utility (13) with bj = 0, so they individuals care about policy only, with some
noise added to make voting probabilistic according to a conditional logit formula.
This model performs poorly when confronted to the data, for two reasons: (1) it
does a bad job at explaining the share of votes obtained by the 5 candidates in
the sample of 748 voters, when the policy positions of the candidates are given
by their average position as determined by these 748 voters and (2) it also does
a very poor job at explaining the policy positions of the ve candidates. More
precisely, AMG obtain two types of equilibria, one with full convergence (where
all candidates propose the centrist position in the sample) and one with partial
convergence (where candidates form two blocks, a two-party block proposing a
moderate left policy and a three-party block proposing a moderate right policy).
They conclude that their policy-onlymodel, together with the assumption
of vote maximization (which is very close to the stochastic partisanship model
developed in section 4) does a poor job at explaining this election.
AMG then move to the unied model, where they add non-policy preferences
by voters. More precisely, they add as covariates the class, income and gender
of the respondent, and his partisanship (dened as the candidate with whom the
respondent identies). This model performs much better than the preceding one
on two counts: (1) it explains much better the share of votes that each candidates
received, when candidates policy positions are set at their average location as seen
by the respondents, and (2) it generates nicely dispersed equilibrium positions, in
the four dimensions studied (left-right, immigration, public sector size and atti-
tude toward church schools). AMG report results on the left-right scale, where
the expected vote functions are nicely concave in a candidate position when all
other candidates positions are kept xed (at their computed equilibrium value).
The equilibrium positions are less extreme than the mean position advocated by
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the partisans of the party, which is in line with the theoretical results provided
above. At the same time, two characteristics of the equilibrium are not found in
the actual candidates positions. First, the extreme parties (the communists and
the Front National) adopt at equilibrium less extreme policies than the moder-
ate (socialists and RPR, respectively) parties. This result falls in line with the
theoretical results presented above, but clashes with the real position of these par-
ties. AMG suggest that extreme political parties do not maximize their expected
vote, but rather an objective which induces them to be more extreme than if they
maximized expected vote. Second, the equilibrium policies are less extreme than
those observed in reality. One way to make the equilibrium policies more extreme
is to introduce the unied model with discountingwhere voters consider that
parties will not be able to enact their announced policy when elected, but rather
will cover the fraction 1   dj of the distance between a status quo position SQ
and the announced policy xj, so that the policy preference of voter i becomes
 a(~xi   (SQ+ (1  dj)(xj   SQ)))2:
Not surprisingly, this modied model (1) generates less convergent (i.e., more
extreme) policy proposals by parties and (2) better ts the empirical data (since
there is an additional degree of freedom in the estimation of the parameter dj).
The estimated value of the parameter (assumed to be the same for all parties j)
is dj = 0:34, meaning that voters discount candidatespromises by one third (and
believe that a candidate will, if elected, move the actual policy to two-thirds of
the distance between the status quo (exogenously set at the midpoint of the 1-7
scale) and the policy advertised by the candidate.
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7.2.2 Norway 1989 elections
AMG proceed in a similar way to study the 1989 elections in Norway, which
counts 7 di¤erent parties. They obtain very similar results, with the policy-
onlymodel incapable of reproducing the vote shares and policy positions of the
parties, and the unied model performing much better on both counts, but
generating positions which are (1) less extreme than the actual positions observed
and (2) such that the extreme right (Progress) party proposes a more centrist
position than the right party. The introduction of discounting in this unied
model also allows to generate more extreme policies, moving them closer to the
observed positions (with a discounting factor dj = 0:47).
AMG also consider an extension to their model, which includes the fact that
parties form one of two coalitions in Norway: a left-wing coalition comprised of two
parties, or a right wing (comprised of 3 parties) (the Liberal and Progress parties
were not potential members of either traditional bloc in 1989). They then consider
that a party maximizes a weighted sum of its expected vote share and of the vote
share of its coalition partners, with a relative weight of  on the latter. They
obtain numerically a unique Nash equilibrium for exogenous values of  (set at
0.5 and 0.75), while a Nash equilibrium does not exist for  = 1. The equilibrium
policies are actually not very responsive to the value of , showing that moving
to coalition considerations does not a¤ect much the partiesequilibrium policies.
Out of 7 parties, 4 equilibrium policies move closer to the actual policy positions,
including the extreme-right party whose position becomes more extreme.
7.3 Adding valence to the empirical unied model
In the two empirical applications with 2 candidates (J = 2) (Frances second round
and US presidential elections, both held in 1988), AMG add a valence component
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(modelled as in section 6.1) to their unied model. They rst estimate a con-
ditional logit voting model with partisanship (and other covariates), where they
interpret the intercept of the conditional logit equation for the winning candidate
(Mitterrand for France, Bush for the US) as the valence of this candidate.18
Before introducing uncertainty (as to the candidates valence or the election
results), they use this model to answer several questions. First, could the losing
candidate have won the elections by choosing another policy (keeping the policy of
the winner constant)? The answer is negative, showing that the winners valence
advantage was large enough to prevent the valence disadvantaged candidate from
winning. Second, they measure the policy leeway of the winner by computing the
range of policies he could have proposed while still winning the election, whatever
the policy choice of his opponent. They nd quite large policy intervals for both
countries, which they call the dominance zoneof the election winner. This in
turn means that the eventual winner had quite a lot of leeway to move close to
his most-preferred policy, while the valence disadvantaged candidate had no such
leeway and had to remain closer to the mean of the electorate.
They then introduce uncertainty for the valence of the winning candidate, as-
suming that this parameter (given by the intercept of their regression) is normally
distributed with some standard deviation V . This model being much more com-
plex than the simple one developed in section 6.1.2, they can not focus on the
median voters voting behavior. Rather, they make the assumption (which they
call approximation) that the valence uncertainty generates a normal distribution
of the expected vote share of both candidates, with a standard deviation which
18AMG also study the 1997 UK election. They exogenously x the Liberal Democrat partys
policy at its observed position, and they endogenize the policy positions of the other two parties
(Labour and Conservative). The rationale for this approach is that pre-election polls gave the
Lib-Dem no chance at all of winning the general election, and that the implemented policy
is assumed to be the one proposed by the party obtaining the plurality. They obtain results
qualitatively very similar to those reported here for the France and US 1988 elections.
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does not vary with the candidates positions. In other words, the expected vote
share of candidate j is given by EVj(xj; x j) + ", where EVj(xj; x j) is computed
from the unied model estimated above, and where " is normally distributed with
a standard deviation of ". The probability of winning of party j is then given by
i(xj; x j) = 

EVj(xj; x j)  0:5
"

;
where  denotes the cdf of the normal distribution.
Solving the model numerically for both of France and the US, they obtain an
equilibrium in pure strategies.19 They obtain in both cases that (1) the valence
advantaged candidate proposes at equilibrium a policy close to his most-preferred
policy (exogenously set for this exercise) while the valence disadvantaged candi-
date locates much closer to the average position of the electorate, and (2) that
both candidates propose more extreme policies than the ones they would have
proposed if their objective had been to maximize their probability of winning the
elections. These two results give strong support to the theoretical predictions
made at the end of section 6.1.2. Moreover, they obtain that the dispersion be-
tween equilibrium policy proposals increases with ". Intutively, as the perceived
election probability becomes less responsive to shift in policies (because of more
valence uncertainty generating more uncertainty as to the winning probabilities),
parties obtain more leeway to move closer to their most-preferred policies ~xj.
AMG also apply the model of electoral uncertainty developed in section 6.1.1,
to the 1988 elections in France and in the US, and the 1997 elections in the UK.
They assume that the uncertainty in the location of the median voter translates
into an uncertain distribution of the expected vote shares of the parties, with a
19They depict the expected utility and expected probability of winning of both candidates, as
a function of the candidates policy proposal, when his opponent policy proposal is xed at his
equilibrium values. The curves depicted are not everywhere quasi-concave, but they do exhibit
a global maximum.
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standard deviation increasing with the distance between the partiespolicy pro-
posals. So, the assumption that the median location is set atm+" with " normally
distributed around zero with standard deviation m translates into an expected
vote function normally distributed with a standard deviation u dened by
u = sm jxA   xBj ;
with s a parameter whose value is inferred from the data. They then proceed to
numerical simulations of the two partiesequilibrium locations as a function of
their (exogenously set) ideologically preferred most-preferred points and amount
of uncertainty m. They obtain a substantial amount of policy dispersion be-
tween the two parties even with low values of m. For such low values, the
valence-advantaged candidate is more extreme than the other candidate, while
the opposite occurs for large values of m. They then argue that the former case
corresponds better to developed countries where the pre-election polls are usually
quite informative, while the latter case (the extreme underdog e¤ect) would
rather occur in less developed countries where pre-election polls are less infor-
mative. To the best of our knowledge, this conjecture concerning less developed
countries has not yet been put to the data.
8 Conclusion
This paper has surveyed the literature dealing with the positioning of political
parties in uni- and multi-dimensional policy spaces. Constraints on the length of
the paper have prevented us from surveying all contributions to this rich literature.
A notable limitation of our survey is the restriction to models with an exogenous
number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected.
We have tried to focus on the main contributions, as well as on the more recent
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ones. Our main focus is on theoretical contributions, but we also survey papers
providing empirical applications of the theoretical concepts developed.
We rst show that, in the absence of uncertainty, parties converge to the same
policy whether they are electorally or policy motivated when the policy space is
unidimensional, and that there is generically no equilibrium in pure strategies
for multidimensional policy spaces. The rst conclusion we draw is then that
introducing some form of uncertainty as to the election results is primordial.
We rst survey the papers assuming that voterspreferences are a¤ected by
a random shock determining the bias the voter has for one of the two parties,
the so-called stochastic partisanship approach. The main result is that parties
converge to the same policy when a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists,
but that equilibrium existence requires a su¢ ciently large amount of uncertainty.
It is worth stressing this point, often forgotten by contributions making use of
this approach, since it indicates that stochastic partisanship probabilistic voting
can actually create existence problems even in one-dimensional settings where a
deterministic, Downsian equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
We then move to an alternative way of introducing uncertainty assuming that
voters do not have partisan preferences, but rather that parties are uncertain as
to the policy preferences of voters. There are important equilibrium existence
issues when parties have electoral motivations, so that we concentrate on policy
motivations. Although there is no satisfactory general existence theorem, the
so-called Wittman equilibrium often exists in uni-dimensional policy spaces, and
exhibits the nice property (empirically validated) that parties do not converge
to the same policy. Unfortunately, equilibria generically fail to exist in multi-
dimensional policy spaces. We then examine the approach pioneered by Roemer,
where parties are composed of two factions, one having electoral motivations while
the other has policy objectives. The resulting Party Unanimity Nash Equilibria
60
often exist, and several papers provide empirical applications of this approach.
Next, we survey models in which candidateselectoral prospects depend on a
valence component votersnon-policy evaluation of candidates and where all
voters agree that one party has better characteristics than another. In a one-
dimensional policy model with valence and no unceratinty with two win and o¢ ce
motivated candidates, Groseclose (2001) proves the non-existence of Nash equilib-
ria in pure strategies. The intuition behind this result is that at any position one of
the two candidates wants to move. This result extends to multidimesinonal policy
two candidates models with no uncertainty, thus showing the knife-edge quality
of the Downs and Wittman results in valence models. Extensions of Glosecloses
model with mixed strategy Nash equilibria are discussed in the Appendix showing
that the knife-edge property of the Downsian model is an illusion since the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium converges to the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium
when the valance advantage converges to zero. In a two-candidate one-dimensional
model with valence, Londregan and Romer (1993) show the existence divergent
policy platforms when parties are uncertain as to candidatesability to generate
constituency services in which the degree of policy polarization increases in the
importance votersgive to the valence issue.
We then examine multi-dimensional policy models in which voters rank can-
didates along a single valence dimension. These models derive the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a Nash equlibrium. Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2000) show that equilibrium existence in a win-motivated two-candidate
no uncertainty model depends on voters ideal policies not being too dispersed
in the policy space, but that equilibria typically fail to exist when candidates
maximize their vote share rather than their probability of wining.
Schoelds (2007) multi-dimensional multi-candidate model shows that can-
didates converge to the electoral mean if the convergence coe¢ cient is less that
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the dimension of the policy space and this happens when voters do not give too
much importance to the policy space (or alternatively, when votes give greater
importance to the valence issue), when their ideal policies are not too dispersed
and when the probability of voting for the lowest valence candidate when all can-
didates locate at the electoral meanis high enough so that the valence di¤erence
between the the lowest valence and all other candidates is not too large. We then
examine extensions to Schoelds (2007) model to elections with regional parties
tha a¤ect convergence to the electoral mean.
We also study Schoelds (2006) endogenous valence model where activists
contribute resouces of time and money in an e¤ort to inuence candidatespolicy
positions when candidates use these resources to inuence votersdecisions. This
endogenous valence model shows that in equilibrium candidateslocate where the
activist and electoral pulls balance each other. The section ends with a discussion
of the empirical evidence on valence models as applied to several elections in
various countries under various political regimes.
In the nal section, we present the unied model developed by Adams,
Merrill and Grofman where voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for
the parties enacting them. More precisely, voters di¤er in their partisanship, with
some being closer to one party and others to another party, with this partisanship
a¤ecting their policy preferences. This unied model has been fruitfully applied
to several elections, such as the 1988 French presidential elections, and the 1989
election in Norway. We also consider an empirical extension where valence is added
to this unied model.
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9 Appendix: Equilibria in mixed strategy with
valence and o¢ ce motivation
Aragones and Palfrey (2002) solve the mixed strategy equilibrium version of the
Groseclose model where candidates chose from a nite number of position and
candidate A has an innitesimal valence advantage (e.g., value of holding o¢ ce,
incumbent performance, constituency service, campaign advertising) over candi-
date D. Candidates maximize their probability of winning but dont know the
location of the median voters ideal point. They assume that voters vote for A
unless D is closer to the voters ideal by some xed distance, . In general, there
is no pure strategy Nash equilibria. In their unique symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium with no gaps, candidates randomize over a fairly small number of po-
sitions in a region near the expected median. They show that as the number of
positions becomes fairly large so that the policy space approximates a continu-
ous space the region over which candidates chose positions converges to that of
the expected median voters position. They nd that as As advantage converges
to zero, the equilibrium probability of winning converges to 1=2. This continuity
result also depends on the valence dimensions playing a minor role in the election.
Aragones and Palfrey conclude the knife-edged property of the Downsian model is
an illusion since the distribution of strategies in the mixed equilibrium converges
to the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium.
In their 2005 paper, Aragones and Palfrey argue that the limitations of their
2002 model is that (1) candidates do not have preferences over policies; (2) hard to
imagine how candidates implement mixed strategies; and (3) candidates have per-
fect information about the objective function of her opponent. Aragones and Pal-
frey (2005) argue that by adding private information they can justify mixed strat-
egy equilibrium and relax these assumptions in a two-candidate two-dimensional
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asymmetric information model where one candidate has a quality advantage and
candidates care about policies and winning. The weight placed on winning and
their ideal policy are the candidates private information with the weight drawn
independently of each candidate from a commonly known distribution. The me-
dian voters ideal point is drawn from a distribution common to both candidates.
They show that candidates locate at the center if and only if her value of holding
o¢ ce is su¢ ciently high. They also show that the advantaged (disadvantaged)
candidate A (D) is more (less) likely to locate at the centre the more likely D
(A) is to locate at the centre. An increase in the uncertainty about the median
voters ideal point (or alternatively, as the electorate becomes more polarized)
makes both candidates more likely to adopt more polarized policies. They show
that the equilibrium policies converge to those of Aragones and Palfrey (2002) as
the weight candidates give to policies converges to zero.
Aragones and Xefteris (2012) develop a two-candidate Downsian model in
which one candidate has a valence advantage and the policy space is continuous.
They assume that voters have quadratic (rather than Euclidean) policy prefer-
ences, thus making candidates payo¤ functions continuous (rather than discon-
tinuous) so that the best response function of the disadvantaged candidate is well
(rather than not well) dened. They study the pure strategy Nash equilibria when
candidatesbeliefs on the distribution of the medians ideal policy is unimodal. In
equilibrium, the advantaged candidate chooses to locate at the expected median
voters ideal with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate chooses to lo-
cate with equal probability at one of two policies symmetrically located about the
expected median. Their results show that an equilibrium exists for any size (small
enough so that there is no pure strategy equilibria) of the advantage if and only
if the variance of the location of the median voters ideal is low enough relative
to the size of the advantage, i.e., when candidates believe that the median voters
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ideal is close enough to 1=2 with high enough probability. The advantage can-
didate adopts policies that are more moderate than the disadvantaged one with
the advantage candidate having a larger probability of winning than the disad-
vantaged candidate. Moreover, they nd that as the advantage increases so does
the probability of the advantaged candidate winning, candidatespolicies become
more di¤erentiated, and the existence conditions on the variance of the medians
ideal are relaxed. As the advantage disappears, the disadvantaged candidates pol-
icy moves closer to the advantage one, thus converging to the standard Downsian
model where both candidates converge to the expected median.
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10 Appendix: Convergence coe¢ cient tables
Table 1: The Convergence Coe¢ cient in Plurality Systemsa
United States United Kingdom
2000 2004 2008 2005 2010
Importance given the policy dimensions ()
Est.  0.82 0.95 0.85 0.15 0.86
(conf. Int.a) (0.71,0.93) (0.82,1.08) (0.73,0.97) (0.13,0.17) (0.81,0.90)
Sum of variance of votersideal policies along two dimensions (2)
2 1.17 1.17 1.63 5.607 1.462
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, 1 = [
Pc
k=1 exp(#k   #1)] 1)
Demb Demc Repc LibDemd Labourd
Est. 1 Dem = 0:4 Dem = 0:4 rep = 0:3 Lib = 0:25 Lab = 0:32
(conf. Int.a) (0.35,0.44) (0.35,0.44) (0.26,0.35) (0.18,0.32) (0.29,0.32)
Convergence coe¢ cient (c  c(#; ; 2) = 2[1  21]2)
Est. c 0.38 0.45 1.1 0.84 0.98
(conf. Int.a) (0.2,0.65) (0.23,0.76) (0.71,1.52) (0.51,1.25) (0.86,1.10)
a Table taken from Gallego and Schoeld 2013, 2015); b Conf. Int. = Condence Intervals;
c US: Dem=Democrats; Rep=Republican; d UK: LibDem=Liberal Democrats.
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Table 2: The Convergence Coe¢ cient in Proportional Systemsa
Israel Turkey Poland
1996 1999 2002 1997
Weight of policy di¤erences ()
Central Est.b of  1.207 0.375 1.520 1.739
(conf. Int.c) (1.076,1.338) (0.203,0.547) (1.285,1.755) (1.512,1.966)
Electoral variance (trace5 = 2)
2 1.732 2.34 2.33 2.00
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, 1 = [
Pp
k=1 exp(#k   #1)] 1)
TWd FPe ANAPe ROPf
Central Est.b of 1 
I
TW = 0:014 FP = 0:08 
T
ANAP = 0:08 
P
ROP = 0:007
(conf. Int.c) (0.006,0.034) (0.046,0.145) (0.038,0.133) (0.002,0.022)
Convergence coe¢ cient (c  c(#; ; 2) = 2[1  21]2)
Central Est.b of c 4.06 1.49 5.75 5.99
(conf. Int.c) (3.474,4.579) (0.675,2.234) (4.388,7.438) (5.782,7.833)
a Table taken from Gallego and Schoeld 2013, 2015); b Central Est. = Central Estimate;
c Conf. Int. = Condence Intervals; d Israel: TW = Third Way;
e Turkey: DYP =True Path Party. f Poland: ROP = Movement for Reconstruction of Poland.
Table 3: The Convergence Coe¢ cient in Anocraciesa
Georgia Russia Azerbaijane
2008 2007 2010
Weight of policy di¤erences ()
Est.  0.78 0.181 1.34
(conf. Int.b) (0.66, 0.89) (0.15,0.20) (0.77,1.91)
Electoral variance (trace5 = 2)
2 1.73 5.90 0.93
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, 1 = [
Pp
k=1 exp(#k   #1)] 1)
Nd SRc AXCP-MPd
Est. 1 
G
N = 0:05 
R
SR = 0:07 AXCP MP = 0:21
(conf. Int.a) (0.03,0.07) (0.04,0.12) (0.08,0.47)
Convergence coe¢ cient (c  c(#; ; 2) = 2[1  21]2)
Est. c 2.42 1.83 1.44
(conf. Int.a) (1.99,2.89) (1.35,2.28) (0.085,2.984)
a Table taken from Gallego and Schoeld 2013, 2015); b Conf. Int. = Condence Intervals;
c Georgia:.N=Natelashvili; d Russia: SR=Fair Russia;
eAzerbaijan: AXCP-MP=Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP) and Musavat (MP).
The estimates for Azerbaijan are less precise because the sample is small.
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